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An important aim of welfare economics is the ordering of alternative social 
states in a complete fashion in terms of social welfare.  For example, suppose there 
are three alternative economic situations denoted by A, B and C.  We can rank these 
three situations according to some decision rule.  One of these decision rules is called 
the Social Welfare Function (SWF).  Economists
1 have agreed that SWF is a function 
of equity and efficiency.  Because of its innocuous nature, the definition of efficiency 
in welfare economics has been widely accepted through the Pareto principle.  
However, this principle has some disadvantages.  According to this criterion, if the 
rich becomes richer due to some policy change, such a change is acceptable.  The 
widely used non-utilitarian Sen SWF (Sen 1974, 1976) and its variants, being linear 
functions of income, can be shown to be Paretian.  This paper questions the 
philosophy of Paretianity as a desirable property of the SWF and proposes a non-
Paretian SWF in the next section.   
 
The total income received by a household can be divided into a number of 
components depending on its source.  Whichever way total income is disaggregated, 
one must be able to determine the exact contribution of each component to total 
welfare.  As the Gini coefficient is one of the arguments of the proposed SWF, a 
method of Gini decomposition is used to disaggregate the SWF into components of 
income.  The relative welfare share of each component can be obtained using this 
decomposition procedure.  However, at times when there are high growth rates or 
inflation in the economy, some components (say, wage or salary) may grow 
comparatively faster than other components.  In this case the elasticity of welfare with 
respect to the mean income of the component might provide a more reliable picture of 
relative effect on total welfare of the component.  These elasticities are helpful in 
facilitating policy discussions about the level of welfare of the society.  This is 
important because a large part of a household’s income is derived from government 
benefits.  Furthermore, the government can influence other sources of income using 
appropriate fiscal policies.  Section III demonstrates the decomposition procedure of 
the SWF and the method of obtaining the elasticity.  In the fourth section we present 
                                                 
1 Among others see Kondor (1975). 
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empirical results based on the Australian Household Expenditure Survey from 1984 to 
1993-94, and discuss the implications of the results.  Some concluding remarks are 
made in the last section. 
 
II  Paretian Principle and the SWF 
 
The individualistic abbreviated SWF can be represented as a function of 
equity and efficiency: 
(1)    W = W(S,q) 
where  S and  q are both functions of  x, the income profile of the society.  S is a 
representation of total income of the society, which captures the efficiency aspect.  q 
= q(x1, x 2,…,xn)   represents the inequality of income in the society, which, in turn, 
represents the equity aspect of the state.  Clearly an increase (decrease) in  S will 
increase (decrease) the social welfare of the society and increase (decrease) in q will 
decrease (increase) the welfare of the society. 
 
  Thus for simplicity, and to quantify the SWF, we adopt a very simple 
definition of equity.  The definition of efficiency in welfare economics is generally 
associated with the Pareto principle.  Because of its relatively innocuous nature this 
principle is widely accepted and it is one of the fundamental properties of a SWF.  
The Pareto principle can be written as: 
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According to the Pareto principle, if there is an increase in income of one person in 
the society, other things remaining equal, social welfare will increase.  An increase in 
one person’s income affects social welfare in two ways: first, by increasing the total 
income of the society and second, by changing the inequality of the society (it could 
increase or decrease depending on whose income has increased).  Thus, if the increase 
in income increases the inequality and if the effect of this increase in inequality is less 
than that of the increase in income ie: 
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then the SWF will satisfy the Pareto Principle.  (This is the case when the extra 
income goes to the person above the mean/median income.  If this extra income goes 
to  a person below the mean/median income, inequality will decrease and thus 
society’s welfare will benefit in two ways).  According to this criterion, if the rich 
become richer due to some policy change the change is acceptable.  As an example let 
us consider a society with three persons having incomes $10, $1 and $0.  Now, 
suppose the government introduces a growth-oriented policy and the income profile 
becomes: 

























































According to any Paretian SWF, this growth process will increase the welfare of the 
society.  Sen (1974) using a non-utilitarian approach
2 introduced axiomatically the 
following SWF: 
(5)    W = m(1-G),  
where m is the mean income of the society and G is the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution.
3  It can be shown that the Sen SWF also follows the Paretian principle; 
thus according to this SWF the welfare of the above society is increasing.  For the Sen 
SWF, the rate of substitution between inequality and efficiency at a constant welfare 
level can be given by: 








Clearly this SWF is highly sensitive to mean income and less sensitive to inequality.  
As both  G and m are determined by the income profile of the society and cannot be 
varied by the decision-maker at different levels of growth or income distribution, this 
SWF is quite rigid.  The marginal welfare change with respect to mean income, in this 
case, is (1-G) which is a constant.  Thus, in the case of an international comparison, 
this SWF will always be biased in favour of developed countries,  which have 
                                                 
2 All the utilitarian SWFs are Paretian. 
 
3 Sen (1976) shows that this index, calculated from the income distribution, ‘is a sub-relation of social 
preference relation defined in the distribution of commodities’.  Alternatively, Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) 
showed that this index could be based on relative deprivation.  Sheshinski (1972) also derived this 
index from the Gini coefficient.  Dagum (1990, 1993) arrived at the same SWF from a somewhat 
different perspective. 
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relatively high per capita incomes and relatively low inequality.  Also, for any country 
the welfare status over time may not be comparable using this SWF, if that country is 




A more generalised class of SWF can be proposed as:W = m 
b (1 - G), 
which is non-Paretian if b is less than 1. 
 
Proof: 
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To satisfy Paretianity this expression has to be greater than zero – that means 
(7) 
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for i=1,..,n    5
which is always true from the lowest income to the median income as the left-hand 
side of the last line of expression (7) is always positive.  The SWF, W = m 
b (1 - G), is 
Paretian if  






,  [putting the maximum value for i in (7)] 
For a large n, (8) can be written as: 
(9)    b b + - ‡ G G 1 
which will never be satisfied for a value of b less than 1. 
 
Thus we find that  
(10)    1 0   ), 1 ( < < - = b mb G W   
could be a generalized class of SWF which is non-Paretian.  Thus with this SWF 
social welfare will decrease if the benefits of the growth process fall only into the 
hands of the richest person in the society.  When the value of b is 0 the SWF will 
become a function of inequality (G) only regardless of the level of efficiency of the 
society.   
 
This SWF with variable values of  b  h as certain advantages over the Sen 
SWF.  For this SWF 










Here the decision-maker has the choice of b, and thus the SWF is now flexible with 
respect to the trade-off between efficiency and equality.  If she wants to attach more 
importance to efficiency than equality she will choose a higher value of  b 
(approaching one), and on the contrary if she is an equity-lover she will set a lower 
value of b.   
 
This SWF is Paretian when the value of b is one , in which case this SWF will 
become the Sen SWF.
4  It is obvious from condition (9) that if only the richest person 
(or group) in society enjoy(s) the benefits of economic growth, the welfare of the 
society will not increase (as long as b<1).  This SWF might be criticised for its bias in 
                                                 
4 Also when b>1 the SWF will satisfy the condition of Paretianity.  However, as our intention is to 
form a non-Paretian SWF we have concentrated in the range 0 to less than 1. 
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favour of the poor.  If there is a rise in income of the poorest irrespective of the value 
of  b and  G (in the specified range, that is, between 0 and 1), social welfare must 
increase.  Thus this SWF has some Rawlsian flavour.  According to a Rawlsian SWF, 
however, if the richest person’s income increases, social welfare remains unchanged.  
But in our SWF (with b<1), an increase in the income of the richest person (or group) 
leads to decrease in social welfare.  This class of SWF (with b<1) is non-Rawlsian 
and not Paretian as well. 
 
IV  SWF decomposed by Components of income 
 














i S = , the factor share of component i and Ci is the concentration coefficient 
of factor i.  The concentration coefficient of the factor is calculated using the same 
formula as the Gini coefficient, only the ranking will remain the same as in the case of 
the Gini coefficient.
6  The value of the coefficient lies between ( -1, 1) and, most 
importantly, it satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition of transfer.  The deviation of the 
Gini coefficient from the concentration coefficient (ie, Ci-G) indicates the direction of 
inequality augmenting or reducing effect of the component  i.  Clearly, if certain 
components of income accrue relatively more to poorer people (for example, 
government’s cash transfer payments) the concentration coefficient will be negative.  
In contrast, if the component of income accrues more to the rich people   (say, 
investment income) the concentration coefficient would be positive and will exceed 
the value of the Gini coefficient. 
 
                                                 
5 See Rao (1967). 
 
6 When a specific factor income is arranged in ascending order of total income and the proportion of 
factor incomes are plotted against the proportions of income units, we get the concentration curve.  One 
minus twice the area of the concentration curve is the concentration index.  Unlike Lorenz curve, the 
concentration curve may lie above the 45
0 diagonal and in that case the concentration index will be 
negative. 
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Proposition 
 
Total welfare is represented as a weighted sum of individual welfare of 
various factor components.  Thus: 





i iW a W
1
 
where  Wi is the welfare of the ith component and  ai is the weight attached to the 




The generalized SWF can be represented as the weighted sum of 
individual component’s welfare. 
 
Proof: 
Using (12) and (13) it is easy to demonstrate the following: 
















     















i a , the weight attached to the  ith factor component and 
) 1 ( i i i C W - =
b m  is the welfare due to the component i.   
 
In this case, the relative welfare due to component i can be found as: 















The trade-off coefficient b does not appear here.  The parameter b serves as a trade-
off coefficient between equity and efficiency.  When we are interested in estimating 
the relative contribution of one component to total welfare, the question of trade-off 
between efficiency and equity does not arise.  The last term in the parenthesis on the   8







has an interesting interpretation and can be 
called ‘relative equity of component  i’.  We have already mentioned that if the 
concentration coefficient of any component is higher (lower) than the overall Gini, the 
component has an inequality augmenting (reducing) effect.  Thus, if the value of the 
relative equity is greater (less) than 1 the  ith component will have an inequality 
reducing (augmenting) effect.  This means that an extra dollar directed to this 
component will decrease society’s inequality.  Moreover, the relative welfare share 
due to component  i depends on the relative mean income and the relative equity of 
component i.   
 
The effects of economic growth in a component on the total welfare of the 
society can be obtained by finding the elasticity of total welfare with respect to the 
mean income of the ith component, as follows: 
(16) 
) 1 )( (
1
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7 is equal to the relative share of the component for b=1 (because the second term 
on the right hand side vanishes for b=1).  When the SWF is non-Paretian, that means 
when b<1, the elasticity is less than the relative share (in this case the second term on 
the right-hand side is negative).  If the factor share of the component is high, the 
second term will be large and will tend to reduce the elasticity more.  Of course, it is 
also true that if the factor share of the component is small the reducing effect will be 
small.  The decision-maker, comparing these elasticities of different components of 
income, might use his/her judgement for an equitable policy prescription.  The effect 
of an increase in government cash benefits can be found using this procedure.  Indeed, 
there have been attempts by government to make non-cash benefits, such as 
subsidised housing, education, medicare etc.  The elasticity provides a clearer picture 
of the effects on total welfare of a proportionate change in any of the income 
components.  Thus the policy maker will be better able to assess whether an increase 
in social insurance, for example, in terms of health protection to all in equal 
                                                 
7 The formal proof is in the appendix. 
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proportion, or a proportionate increase in wage rate will be more effective from a 
social welfare point of view. 
 
Lemma 1 
For a non-Paretian SWF the effect of economic growth on a component 
(when there is no change in inequality) will be less than the share of 
welfare of the component. 
 
The proof of lemma 1 follows from equations (15) and (16). 
 
  Since in most of the cases the legitimacy of efficiency criterion is very high, 
policy makers might consider a high value of b.  For a high value of b the reducing 
effect of the second term on the right-hand side of equation (16) will be small.  For 
those cases where there are components with high factor share along with high 
elasticity value, a cautious examination of the relative equity of the component is very 
important.  A c omponent with a high relative factor share can generate a high 
elasticity value.  However, if it has a considerable inequality augmenting effect due to 
low relative equity (sufficiently less than one) that component should not be the target 
component. 
 
V  Welfare Trends in Australia: 1984 to 1993-94 
 
The present study is based on micro data obtained from Australian Household 
Expenditure Surveys of 1984, 1988-89 and 1993-94.
8  These surveys were designed to 
obtain details of expenditures, income, and a wide range of demographic 
characteristics of households.  The surveys cover all households living in private 
dwellings and caravan parks in Australia, except those areas with 0.6 dwellings per 
square kilometre.  The population coverage of the surveys was more than 90%.   
 
This study has used the concept of gross private income which includes 
incomes accrued from all sources before taxes are paid, but excludes income in kind 
and the employers’ contribution to superannuation.  Sometimes it is argued that gross 
                                                 
8 The sample size for these three years are respectively 9571, 7225 and 9733. 
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income is inappropriate to study the redistributive impact of the tax structure (because 
the actual income distribution of the country for analysis should be the post-tax 
income).  However, we focus on gross income because of privacy of tax data.
9   
 
The next step is to introduce the appropriate unit whose income or welfare we 
are concerned with.  We have chosen the household as the unit of analysis.  As an 
indicator of welfare, the income of one household cannot be compared directly with 
the income of another household (unless the two households are identical).  In 
general, households differ in size and composition.  Therefore, appropriate weights 
need to be assigned to households with differing size and composition. 
 
Regarding the problem of adjusting income for the purpose of ranking the 
level of well-being, it is imperative to adjust household income on the basis of size 
and composition.  As a way of comparing the level of well being we use the income 
per head of the household, which is obtained by dividing total income of a household 
by the number of members.
10  The size of household is used as the natural weight of 
the household.   
 
To gain an impression of the trend in inequality in Australia between 1984 and 
1993-94, we first present Table 1, which contains cumulative shares of decile groups 
for per capita gross incomes, earned income, unearned income and government cash 
benefits.  Also, in the last row we present the concentration coefficients of the 
components and the Gini coefficients of total income in each survey period.  This 
table shows that household income inequality in Australia has been rising over the 
period, as indicated by the rising value of the Gini coefficient.  From the decile shares, 
we find that there has been a secular decline in the share of the bottom decile.  It is 
evident that the income share of the poorest fifty per cent of the population has 
                                                 
9 The tax data released with the data set of 1980s were based on previous years’ tax consideration.  For 
1993-94 they are imputed values.  Thus, they are not a reliable measure if income is in the current 
period. 
 
10 Although, this procedure is somewhat better than unadjusted income, critics pointed out the 
requirement of an equivalent adult scale.  Our results do not show any trend difference on the basis of 
equivalent adult scale and on per capita income.  Thus we will present here only the results based on 
per capita income. 
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steadily declined and that the income share of the richer fifty percent of the population 
has steadily increased.   
 
Table 1 
Cumulative Income Shares at different deciles for various components: 1984-
1993-94 
 
Decile  Share 

























Lowest  0.97  0.63  0.13  2.17  2.22  2.22  15.07  15.54  11.43  2.67  2.24  1.72 
Second  3.85  3.65  2.51  4.80  4.96  5.41  31.23  33.20  25.66  7.03  6.45  5.68 
Third  7.40  6.51  5.27  8.53  8.91  8.53  50.57  56.17  45.50  12.38  11.65  10.66 
Fourth  11.92  11.56  8.92  14.14  15.49  14.00  68.31  71.42  66.05  18.49  17.84  16.60 
Fifth  19.08  18.83  15.30  20.24  22.80  21.19  76.89  79.59  77.84  25.72  25.21  23.73 
Sixth  28.34  27.78  23.65  29.68  29.90  31.87  83.84  87.25  86.54  34.74  33.89  32.29 
Seventh  39.01  38.90  34.72  38.86  38.99  41.87  90.22  92.58  92.52  44.80  44.26  42.63 
Eighth  52.10  52.76  49.23  52.03  50.47  53.48  95.92  96.53  96.31  57.06  56.94  54.57 
Ninth  69.91  71.06  68.29  68.23  65.59  67.43  98.97  98.54  98.80  73.05  73.36  72.16 
Share in total  80.03  81.94  80.32  8.98  8.08  6.85  10.99  9.98  12.83  100  100  100 
Concentration 
Coefficient 




Note: * these are the Gini coefficients 
  Table 1 considers only three broad categories of income viz, the earned 
income, the unearned income and the government cash benefit.  Earned income 
consists of income from wages, salaries and privately owned businesses while 
unearned income consists of income from all other sources except government 
transfer payments.  This latter refers to income generated mainly from capital assets.  
Government cash benefits are various types of pensions and unemployment benefits.  
Age pensions constitute the major part in this category.  Quite naturally, both earned 
income and unearned income rise across ascending deciles.  However, some 
government benefits also flow into the upper deciles.  We shall provide an 
explanation for this later.  We notice that government benefits constitute a very 
significant part of total income of the first three deciles.  Some retirees earn   12
investment income, which is included as a part of unearned income at the lowest 
decile. 
 
  The last two rows of Table 1 show the share of the component and the 
concentration coefficients.  The share of earned income is maximum at around 80 
percent, while the share of government benefits is 10 to 12 percent.  The latter shows 
an increasing trend due mainly to increased numbers of unemployed.  The Gini 
coefficients of total income are estimated to be 0.358, 0.364 and 0.386 for the years 
1984, 198-89 and 1993-94.  The values of the concentration coefficients of both 
earned and unearned income are always more than the overall Gini coefficient, 
illustrating their inequality-augmenting effect.  On the other hand, the negative values 
of the concentration coefficients related to government transfer payments express its 
inequality-reducing effect.   
 
  To examine these in more detail, total income is decomposed into nine 
different components: wages and salaries; own business/self employed; age pensions; 
widow’s pensions; unemployment benefits; sickness benefits; superannuation/annuity; 
investment income; and others.  
 
  The numerical results of the trend of individual components’ welfare is 
presented in Table 2, with the contributions of each factor in total welfare and its 
trend over 1984 to 1993-94 given in Table 3. 
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Table 2 
 
Trend of Social Welfare in Australia for Different Factor Incomes of the Household 
Head – 1984 to 1993-94 
 
  Wi (b=0.5)  Wi (b=0.75)  Wi (b=1.0) 












Wages and Salaries  7.38  7.56  6.96  27.02  27.75  25.64  98.92  101.93  94.47 




















Age Pensions  3.77  3.75  4.63  6.48  6.24  8.90  11.13  10.39  17.11 










































Investment Income  1.11  0.70  0.85  1.81  1.02  1.27  2.97  1.51  1.91 
Others  4.75  4.89  4.96  10.43  10.82  10.59  22.90  23.95  22.62 
Total  10.12  10.02  9.76  40.20  39.79  38.90  159.63  157.93  155.10 
 
It is noticeable that wages and salaries continued to be the major component 
contributing around 73 percent to total income.  The relative share of welfare for this 
component decreased during the period 1984 to 1993-94 by only 1.58 percent, 
although an increase of 1.78 percent was recorded from 1984 to 1988-89.  Individual 
welfare for this component decreased by 5.69 percent (b=0.5) between 1988-89 to 
1993-94.  The numerical values are 5.11 percent and 4.50 percent respectively for b 
equal to 0.75 and 1.  This decrease in the numerical value is attributable to the fact 
that income from this component of income was distributed unevenly.  Moreover, a 
slight decrease in the income share of this component showed a large decrease in 
individual welfare for a high value of b.  
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Table 3 
 
Contribution to Welfare and its Components of Different Factor Components of 
Income: 1984 to 1993-94 
 
  Factor Share (%),  
mi/m 
Relative Equity,  
(1-Ci)/(1-G) 
Relative Share of Welfare 
(%), aiWi/W 












Wages and Salaries  72.19  73.32  72.92  0.858  0.869  0.836  61.94  63.72  60.96 




















Age Pensions  3.48  3.98  5.35  1.992  2.126  2.042  6.93  8.86  10.93 










































Investment Income  2.94  1.92  1.96  0.642  0.503  0.616  1.89  0.97  1.21 
Others  9.33  9.67  8.23  1.537  1.572  1.772  14.34  15.20  14.57 
 
  The second major component of income is the business income with a factor 
share of 7.85 percent in 1984, decreasing to 7.41 percent in 1993-94.  The 
concentration coefficient of this component remained high over the period.  The 
contribution of this component to total welfare decreased by more than 2 percent in 
1993-94 from 7.62 percent in 1984.  The contribution to total welfare increased 
substantially for age pensions.  All the components of government transfer payments 
(ie, age pensions, widow’s pensions, unemployment benefits and sickness benefits) 
had an inequality-reducing effect, with unemployment benefits particularly marked as 
compared to other transfer components.  The individual welfare for widow’s pensions 
and sickness benefits decreased during 1984 to 1993-94.  There was an increase in 
individual welfare of superannuation/annuity until 1988-89, yet its contribution to 
total welfare remained very low. 
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Table 4 
 
Trend of Elasticity of Social Welfare with Respect to Mean Income in Australia for 
Different Factor Incomes of the Household Head – 1984 to 1993-94 
 
  W
i m h  (b=0.5)  W
i m h  (b=0.75)  W
i m h  (b=0.9) 












Wages and Salaries  0.258  0.271  0.245  0.439  0.454  0.427  0.547  0.564  0.537 




















Age Pensions  0.052  0.069  0.083  0.061  0.079  0.096  0.066  0.093  0.104 




























































Others  0.097  0.104  0.105  0.120  0.128  0.125  0.134  0.142  0.137 
 
Table 4 shows the numerical values for the elasticity of social welfare with respect to 
mean income.  Despite its substantially high inequality-augmenting effect, the 
elasticity of wages and salaries remained high (because of its high factor share).  It is 
interesting to note that investment income had a negligible effect on welfare.  
Similarly, superannuation and annuity income do not appear to have much effect on 
welfare.  In Table 3 we saw that all types of government benefits provided inequality-
reducing effects.  Of these, old age pensions and the unemployment benefits are by far 
the most important because of their high factor share.  For both components, the 
elasticity decreased slightly during 1988-89, but increased again over the next five 
year period.  The elasticity of widow’s pension and the sickness benefit decreased 
throughout the period, although their contribution, more recently, to total welfare is 
negligible.  From Table 4 we can infer that if unemployment benefit increased 10 
percent (distributed proportionately) will elicit a 0.46 percent (for b=0.9) increase in 
welfare.  A similar increase in age pensions would increase welfare by 1.04 percent 
(for same b in the period 1993-94).  If wages and salaries component were to increase 
by 10 percent, welfare in the period 1988-89 to 1993-94 will increase by almost 5 
percent (for same b) but that it will increase inequality in the society. 
 
  The results presented here cannot be compared with those previously obtained, 
since we have used a totally different methodology.  However, the trend of inequality   16
measures can be obtained from Australian Bureau of Statistics (Catalogue No. 6537.0, 
The effect of Government Benefits and Taxes on Household income, various issues) 
and Economic Planning Advisory Council (Social Wage).   
 
V  Conclusion 
 
  In all aspects of public policy there are both positive and normative issues that 
must be addressed.  Welfare economics provides the necessary foundations upon 
which positive issues can be analysed and therefore promotes a more informed debate 
of normative issues.  Social decision makers have a set of value judgments that guide 
them in making policy decisions.  For most social states the objective of the decision 
maker is to allocate the scarce resources and also to promote an equitable distribution 
of those resources.  Thus ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ become two important arguments 
of the social welfare function.  For several years, Pareto Optimality, as the definition 
of efficiency, has established a wide range of consensus.  The notion of efficiency 
based on Pareto Optimality is not a positive concept.  The Pareto optimality criterion 
is a value judgment, which intentionally avoids interpersonal comparison of utility.  
Pareto optimality rejects the ethics that individuals h ave equal capacity to enjoy a 
given share of income.  It gives greater weights to the people having higher income.  
With this judgment a growth process accruing money only to the richest person of the 
society is desirable.  Pareto optimality and also a Pareto utility function (since a 
Paretian utility function is a linear function of income) are indifferent with respect to 
the economic unit that receive an additive increase of income.  The conclusion will be 
different if the increase is a percentage of the  economic unit’s income.  Since the 
Pareto principle avoids interpersonal comparison of utility, hence, is utilitarian, and 
the utility function is concave (linear for Pareto), an increase in income of any 
economic unit will increase both individual and total welfare.  By viewing the real 
world, where for most social situations the majority of the population is poor 
compared to a very small number of rich people, it is difficult to accept that the 
majority would want social policies to be formulated on Pareto criteria.  Thus for a 
decision maker a policy is not necessarily welfare-augmenting simply because it 
raises efficiency.  The flexibility of the SWF and the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency is another aspect to consider.  This paper has argued that it is possible to   17
generalize the widely used Sen SWF, which can be non-Paretian under special 
circumstances.  
 
Also it has been demonstrated that a disaggregation of this SWF by 
components of income can be done.  It is shown that the relative contribution of 
welfare of one factor depends on two components: the factor share and the relative 
equity of the component.  It is also shown that the growth of one component can 
generate a negative element when the SWF is non-Paretian.  The value of this 
negative effect is larger, the larger the factor share of the component.  The method is 
important in benefit/cost analysis and in the determination of the target component.   
 
  A comprehensive analysis of the welfare effects of various components of 
total household income in Australia is presented here.  The disaggregation method is 
applied on Household Expenditure Survey data published by Australian Bureau of 
Statistics of the years 1984, 1988-89 and 1993-94.  It was found that wages and 
salaries made the maximum contribution in factor share, despite its inequality-
augmenting effect the elasticity of this component has maintained a very high value.  
The elasticity of welfare increased for age pensions, for unemployment benefits and 
superannuation/annuity.  The results are immensely important with respect to the 
redistributive policies. 
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Appendix 
 
Derivation of equation (16) 
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